University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Management Department Faculty Publications

Management Department

2011

DIALOGUE
Asghar Zardkoohi
Texas A&M University

Leonard Bierman
Texas A&M University

Daria Panina
Texas A&M University

Subrata Chakrabarty
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, chakrabarty@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Management
Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons
Zardkoohi, Asghar; Bierman, Leonard; Panina, Daria; and Chakrabarty, Subrata, "DIALOGUE" (2011). Management Department
Faculty Publications. 197.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/managementfacpub/197

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Management Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Management Department Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.

? Academy of Management Review

2011, Vol. 36, No. 1, 180-187.

DIALOGUE
Revisiting a Proposed Definition of
Professional Service Firms

Knowledge Intensity and
Professionalized Workforce

In a recent Academy of Management Review

Knowledge intensity is touted as "perhaps the
most fundamental distinctive characteristic of
PSFs," which is said to permeate throughout the
organization, including "frontline workers" (von

article, Professor Andrew von Nordenflycht (2010)

focused on defining professional service firms
(PSFs). In the article von Nordenflycht argues that

past research leaves the term professional service
firms either undefined or at best provides only
examples, such as law firms, accounting firms,

Nordenflycht, 2010: 159). However, knowledge in?
tensity creates two problems for PSFs: cat herd?
ing and opaque quality (von Nordenflycht, 2010).

We discuss each in turn.
"etc." In addition, he argues that while most schol?
ars agree that law firms and accounting firms fit
Cat herding. Cat herding refers to the chal?
the "definition" of PSFs, there is "little consensus lenges of "retaining and directing" skilled and
on what the 'etc.' refers to. Does it include ad
agencies? Physician practices? Software firms?

Why or why not?" (2010: 155). The author's contri?

butions include (1) identifying three distinctive
characteristics associated with PSFs (i.e., knowl?
edge intensity, low capital intensity, and a profes?

sionalized workforce), (2) arguing that while all
PSFs share knowledge intensity, they may vary
based on the degree of intensity of the other two
characteristics (i.e., capital intensity and profes?
sionalized workforce), and (3) describing manage?
rial challenges facing each structural form and
providing solutions. In this dialogue we discuss

professionalized employees with "substantial
human capital (such as complex knowledge)"

who have "a strong bargaining position relative
to the firm, since their skills are scarce and, in
many instances, transferable across firms" (von
Nordenflycht, 2010: 160). Regulation by orga?
nized professions through their codes provides
for "strong preferences for autonomy" (2010: 160)

and "a responsibility to protect the interests of
clients and/or society ... against a 'commercial'
or 'economic' ethos that allows unfettered pur?
suit of self-interest" (2010: 163). An implication of

such regulation is "muted competition," both
against potential entrants into the profession

the limitations of the proposed definition, question

the managerial challenges von Nordenflycht as?
sociates with PSFs, and critique the correspond?

through licensing requirements and among pro?
fessionals. Thus, "in the name of preserving the
profession's trustworthiness, professional codes
tend to prohibit a range of commercially com?
petitive behavior, including soliciting competi?

ing solutions he offers.

THE PROPOSED DEFINITION

tors' clients, advertising in any way. .., and

Based on a review of the PSF literature for a
definition, von Nordenflycht "landed on three
characteristics?knowledge intensity, low capi?

even competing on price" (2010: 164). The orga?
nizational slack resulting from such muted com?

petition provides

tal intensity, and a professionalized work?
force?as the central ones" (2010: 159). These
three distinctive characteristics were chosen

an opportunity to address the challenges of cat

herding in ways that would not be possible in
more competitive environments. For example,

"because (1) they can be well defined, (2) they

firms may be better able to satisfy employee pref?

are commonly noted as distinctive characteris?

erences for autonomy by adopting highly auton?

omous and informal structures, whose conse?

tics ..., and (3) they have been linked in the
literature ... to distinctive managerial chal?
lenges or organizational outcomes" (2010: 159).

Focusing on the three characteristics, von Nor?
denflycht (2010) suggests developing "a taxon?
omy of knowledge-intensive firms" that vary in
the degree of capital intensity and workforce
professionalization (2010: 157).

quent lack of internal coordination might be too
inefficient in more competitive environments
(2010: 164).

Von Nordenflycht provides two organizational
solutions to help with the problem of cat herd?
ing: (1) alternative incentive mechanisms, "such
as contingent and/or deferred compensation,"
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and (2) allowing "autonomy and informality in pated events may occur that provide time
dependent information at the "local" level, to
organizational structure" (2010: 161).
We argue that whether professionals (with which professionals react autonomously. In
substantial and complex human capital) appear these contexts the professional has the relevant
to behave like cats or like well-mannered em?
information to behave independently and au?
tonomously, not the supervisor. Thus, allowing
ployees depends on (1) how easily they can be
replaced by the employer (i.e., how competitive autonomy is not a concession to professionals in
the labor market is for their expertise) and/or (2)

whether the task and its contexts require an
autonomous or decentralized decision-making
structure. On the first issue, the more competi?

service organizations but, rather, an efficient or?

ganizational response to the decentralized na?
ture of information held by professionals.

Opaque quality. Opaque quality means that

tive the market for their expertise, the more complex knowledge of the expert "is hard for
likely professionals will lose their job if they nonexperts (i.e., customers) to evaluate, even af?
behave like cats. Given market competition and
ter the output is produced and delivered" (von
the transferability of human capital in many Nordenflycht, 2010: 161). Von Nordenflycht ar?
professional organizations, such employees are gues that opaque quality gives rise to at least
four types of measures PSFs undertake in re?
replaceable and, thus, easily salvageable. Al?
sponse to the challenge of opaqueness: bond?
though transferability of human capital may al?
low an employee catlike behavior, since he or ing, reputation, appearance, and ethical codes.
she may threaten to move to a competitor (were An example he invokes for bonding is the "un?
limited liability partnership" structure to induce
it not for a noncompete clause), transferability
also affords the firm the ability to hire from "partners to monitor and pressure each other to
competitors. Thus, cat herding problems do not provide quality service since each is at risk for
arise because knowledge is complex; they may any actions of the others that expose the firm to
arise because of lack of competition in the mar?
financial or legal liability" (2010: 161).
Is the opaque quality of services provided by
ket for a given professional. However, even in
this case there is a limit to catlike behaviors.
PSFs an explanation for unlimited liability? Our
observations indicate that most traditional PSFs
Consider, for example, one of the most canoni?
cal examples of PSFs: law firms. In this case a are organized as limited liability partnerships
cursory examination would reveal a high de? (i.e., LLPs). For example, virtually all of the larg?
gree of competition among a group of highly est 200 law firms in the United States have the
touted professionals: lawyers. Besides the on? LLP postfix after their name. In addition, the U.S.
line legal service advertisements, one cannot and European subsidiaries of the major account?
ing firms have similar structures?for example,
avoid repeated commercials by law firms invit?
ing injured workers or patients suffering from KPMG Europe LLP and KPMG America LLP. All
the KPMG operations in different areas of the
side effects of medication to patronize their ser?
world are set up independently as LLPs so as to
vices. In addition, a significant increase in lat?
eral movements by associates and partners prevent cross-liabilities and cap liability expo?
across firms strongly suggests competition in sure (Greenwood & Empson, 2003). There are a
few reasons for adoption of limited liability.
the labor market for such professionalized talent
(Henderson & Bierman, 2009).
First, given the large size of many PSFs, as?
We argue that an alternative explanation for sumption of liability by each partner for the en?
the appearance of catlike behavior (i.e., auton? tire organization is too costly and, thus, econom?
omy at work) is a context that requires decen?
ically infeasible. Second, cross-monitoring of
tralized decision making for efficiency reasons. partners by partners is impractical when the
Think of professors in classrooms, surgeons in PSFs are geographically diversified, with many
national and multinational branches. Assump?
operating rooms, or lawyers in courtrooms?all
tion of unlimited liability in these situations
three groups are led by their own initiative in
performing their tasks, with relatively little day would expose each partner to high risks if he or
to-day regard for administrative superiors. Such

catlike behavior is organizationally efficient,

given the idiosyncratic nature of the tasks, re?
quiring decentralized decision rights. Unantici

she were not in a position to monitor the behav?
ior of other partners. Finally, as the size of PSFs
increases, the free-rider problem by each part?
ner can prevent effective monitoring. For exam
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pie, while the cost of monitoring other partners
would be absorbed by a given partner, its ben?
efits would be spread across all partners, thus
arguably creating a free-rider problem. Given
the impracticality of cross-monitoring in large
and geographically diversified PSFs, unlimited
liability has been replaced by limited liability

in many cases.
We believe high monitoring costs have an?
other organizational implication: contingent

compensation systems. Contrary to von Norden
flycht's claim that "contingent and/or deferred

compensation" (2010: 161) systems are a re?

sponse to the cat herding challenge, we believe
instead that the high monitoring costs are the
main explanation for the adoption of such com?
pensation systems, where each partner's com?

having outside investors as monitors, the firm
may resort to alternative compensation mea?
sures and to employee autonomy and informal?

ity as two measures of managing cat herding
problems.
With all due respect, we disagree with both
implications. First, as discussed above, whether

cat mentalities dominate PSFs hinges on the

competitiveness of the labor market for the pro?

fession in question. Competition and, thus,

transferability in such markets afford the firm
the ability to replace those "who choose not to
ride up the elevator." Second, in spite of whether

ownership is internal or external, alternative
compensation measures and greater employee

autonomy may or may not be efficient organiza?

tional characteristics on their own. Given the

pensation is contingent on his or her perfor?
mance only. In general, when monitoring costs

nature of tasks in PSFs, such as law firms, hos?

(Brickley, Smith, & Zimmerman, 2008; Milgrom &
Roberts, 1992).

resents an organizational approach to efficient
utilization of local information held by profes?
sionals (Brickley et al., 2008; Milgrom & Roberts,
1992).

pitals, universities, and the like, jobs are de?
signed to afford professionals decision rights
and, hence, autonomy. We stress that such au?
trol?in such systems employees become their tonomy in decision rights does not signify a
own monitors since shirking at work will di? compromise or a concession to professionals
rectly cost them part of their compensation who would otherwise behave like cats but rep?

are high, organizations use contingent pay sys?
tems as a substitute for monitoring and con?

Low Capital Intensity
While von Nordenflycht's paper allows for

flexibility in capital intensity, low capital inten?

Ownership Structure

sity has a special place in his framework. In
Regarding ownership structure of PSFs, von
particular, low capital intensity is said to have Nordenflycht argues that there "is a resistance
two implications. First, PSFs requiring low cap?
to having nonprofessionals, especially commer?
ital intensity will further increase "employee cially oriented nonprofessionals (such as inves?
bargaining power" because (1) relatively speak? tors), involved in the ownership and governance
ing, if capital intensity is low, human capital of professional firms," because PSFs have a
intensity becomes even more important; (2) with "core of professional codes of ethics," whereas
the low cost of capital, employees may "easily commercially oriented investors would encour?
start up their own firms"; and (3) "without non age "unfettered pursuit of self-interest" (2010:
human capital to specialize to, there is less 163). This argument also appears open to ques?
likelihood of generating firm-specific human tion. We believe that the alternative ownership
structures that PSFs assume will ultimately rep?
capital, which would reduce employee mobility"
(2010: 162). Thus, "if knowledge intensity creates
resent the most efficient organizational ap?
the cat herding problem, adding low capital proaches to risk sharing. A casual examination
intensity turns it into a situation where the of the most touted and canonical PSFs (e.g., law
assets go down the elevator each night ... and firms) indicates that some PSFs have even em?
the firm can't control whether they come back" braced the corporate form. For example, law
(2010: 162). Second, low capital intensity creates
firms in Australia are now permitted to sell
shares of stock on the open market. This kind of
the opportunity to lower "the need for raising
investment funds and thereby reduces the ownership allows for considerable risk spread?
need to organize in ways that protect outside
ing in large class action and contingent fee
investors" (2010: 162). The author states that, not cases (Regan, 2009).
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TABLE 1
Summary of Some Key Arguments
Concept

von Nordenflycht's (2010) Argument

Our Argument

Knowledge intensity:

? Not being able to direct or supervise employees is
a problem (pp. 160-161).
? The solution is to give the employee autonomy?

Independence in behavior is not the same thing
as "cat herding" behavior. The former arises
because of the nature of tasks and
information asymmetry between
professionals and their supervisors. Consider
professors in classrooms, surgeons in
operating rooms, and lawyers in courtrooms:
all three groups are led by their own
initiative as they perform their respective
jobs, with no regard for administrative
superiors. When the relevant information of
the context is held by the professional and
the task is idiosyncratic, efficient organization?
al structure requires a decentralized decision
rights system. While professionals in these
contexts appear to behave like independent
cats, such behaviors are efficient in these
contexts.
The need for (or lack of) employee autonomy
(i.e., decentralization of decision rights)
within an organization has less to do with its
employees' personal preferences and more to
do with deciding on a structure that is
efficient given the context of the task and the
location of the relevant information in the
hierarchy.

Direction

difficulties

by not trying to direct or supervise (pp. 160-161).

Professionalized
workforce:

Autonomy

Knowledge intensity:

Retaining

difficulties

"Firms may be better able to satisfy employee
preferences for autonomy by adopting highly
autonomous and informal structures, whose
consequent lack of internal coordination might be
too inefficient in more competitive environments"
(p. 164).
There are difficulties in retaining skilled employees

with "substantial human capital (such as
complex knowledge)" who have "a strong

? There is a limit to job switching, because a

bargaining position relative to the firm, since
their skills are scarce and, in many instances,
transferable across firms" (p. 160).

Opaque quality

(customers are
nonexperts;

cannot evaluate

quality of service)

Low capital
intensity:

Employee mobility

Ownership structure:

No outside
ownership

? Transferability/mobility also affords the firm
the ability to hire from competitors.

professional will face difficulty in moving if
known to have such catlike behavior.
? Hence, in a free market, catlike behavior of

excessively switching jobs will be solved on
its own over time.

PSFs resolve opaqueness via unlimited liability
partnership structures to induce "partners to
monitor and pressure each other to provide
quality service since each is at risk for any
actions of the others that expose the firm to
financial or legal liability" (p. 161).

Most traditional PSFs and their subsidiaries are
organized as limited liability partnerships
(i.e., LLPs). In other words, personal wealth is
not exposed to liability when such PSFs or
subsidiaries are sued. The goal is to prevent
cross-liabilities when faced with lawsuits;
opaqueness is the least of their concerns

here.

Low capital intensity increases "employee
bargaining power.... if knowledge intensity
creates the cat herding problem, adding low

capital intensity turns it into a situation where
the assets go down the elevator each night...
and the firm can't control whether they come

back" (p. 162).

? Low capital intensity gives the firm the
opportunity to avoid outside investors as monitors
so that the firm has the freedom to adopt efficient

measures of alternative compensation, employee

autonomy, and informality (p. 162).
? There "is a resistance to having nonprofessionals,
especially commercially oriented
nonprofessionals (such as investors), involved in
the ownership and governance," because PSFs
have a "core of professional codes of ethics,"
whereas commercially oriented investors
encourage "unfettered pursuit of self-interest"
(p. 163).

Finally, while law firms in the United States
are not currently permitted to share risks with
outside equity investors in this manner, outside

investments have nevertheless crept into the

U.S. legal system through the back door. Instead

Competition and transferability in markets
afford the firm the ability to replace those
who choose not to ride up the elevator in the

morning.

? These arguments are questionable and

contrary to the corporate governance
literature. Why would an outside investor
object to organizational measures if they are
efficient? Outside investors support measures
that are perceived to improve efficiency and
performance because their wealth is at stake.
? In a number of countries, law firms have
embraced the "corporate form," with stocks
traded on the open market. Further, outside
investors in the United States (such as hedge
funds) invest in plaintiffs' cases as a
substitute for direct investment in law firms.

of directly investing in law firms, outside inves?

tors in the United States (in this case, hedge

funds) have recently started investing in plain?
tiffs' cases?cases that would probably not oth?
erwise be brought by plaintiffs for the risk of
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losing. Investment in a portfolio of such cases
lowers the cost associated with risk and works
as a substitute for investment in law firms by
outside investors (Glater, 2009).

January

iagement Review
equilibrium for corporate law firms. Georgetown Journal
of Legal Ethics, 22: 1395-1430.

Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. 1992. Economics, organization &
management Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Regan, M. C, Jr. 2009. Lawyers, symbols, and money: Outside

DISCUSSION AND

CONCLUDING REMARKS
We believe the proper question is not how to
define a PSF but how a given service becomes
optimally organized. The difference in these two

approaches is significant. In this dialogue we
have attempted to explain why PSFs, even in
some of the most "canonical" examples (e.g.,
law firms), fail to follow the "traditional" defini?

tion. Growth in the size and geographic diversi?
fication of law firms have transformed their or?

ganizational structures and in some cases even
allowed outside investment. Moreover, most
large law firms in the United States, at least, are
organizationally structured as LLPs and are in?
creasingly active in marketing and advertising
their services.

In sum, we believe an attempt at defining

investment in law firms. Penn State International Law
Review, 27: 407-439.

von Nordenflycht, A. 2010. What is a professional service
firm? Toward a theory and taxonomy of knowledge
intensive firms. Academy of Management Review, 35:
155-174.

Asghar Zardkoohi
Leonard Bierman

Daria Panina

Texas A&M University

Subrata Chakrabarty

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Let's Get Testing: Making Progress on
Understanding Professional Service Firms

organizational structure and ownership for any
distinct group of firms, including PSFs, is ex?
posed to creating too many exceptions that may

First, let me offer sincere thanks to Professor
Zardkoohi and his coauthors for their thoughtful
critique. My goal was to generate just such dis?

ticular, the problem of defining PSFs is that
while a given definition may in one context

hope my detailed response is seen in that light.
To begin, I want to offer some important con?
text about the article's intent both to help inter?
pret the critique and to suggest where research?
ers might go from here. The intent of the article
was to sort through a disconnected body of lit?
erature to offer an integrated theoretical frame?
work that facilitates future research on profes?
sional service firms (PSFs) in three ways: (1) by

fall outside the confines of the definition. In par?

neatly correspond to the existing organizational
structure and ownership, changes in the context
can render the definition irrelevant over time. As

an alternative to defining a distinct group of

firms, it might be more productive to examine
how a distinct group of firms becomes optimally

organized as contexts change. Indeed, this ap?

pears to represent a key opportunity for future
research in this area. We provide a summary of
our primary critiques of von Nordenflycht's ar?
guments in Table 1.
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